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 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ SWERGOLD: Good afternoon, your Honor, Jason Swergold for the government.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MR. FLOOD: Your Honor, good afternoon, Christopher Flood, Federal Defenders of New York, here with Sylvie Levine from our office and Mr. Kevin Johnson.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

Where are we? I think it's time to set a motion schedule.

MR. FLOOD: Yes, your Honor. Here is where we are. We have had possession of electronic data and validation studies from the OCME since the afternoon of March 21. The OCME did not enable Mr. Swergold to be able to provide rolling discovery, unfortunately. Since that moment we have provided those materials to our experts and asked them to get back to us as soon as they could. Ms. Levine and I have been burning midnight oil trying to clarify our understanding and sharpen it around this very complicated topic. And here is where we are with regard to the Daubert issue. We firmly believe that there is a latent Daubert issue regarding the testing in Mr. Johnson's case, although it's somewhat unripe because we have not actually gotten expert notice from Mr. Swergold because we have not requested it, so we got to go through those sort of specific steps first, I think.

THE COURT: Perhaps, but I thought you were going to move to suppress the -- this is DNA, DNA that was allegedly found on the gun.

MR. FLOOD: That's right.

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THE COURT: You are going to suppress it, move to suppress it on the ground that whatever scientific methodology the government used, in your view, is not reliable, does not comply with scientific methods, yadda, yadda, yadda.

MR. FLOOD: Specifically any testimony that would be offered would be unreliable. It's not like if you violate the Fourth Amendment. It would be based in *Daubert*, which would be that based on the Rule 702, which is that the expert testimony that would be proffered --

THE COURT: I see your point.

MR. FLOOD: We can get that taken care of with speed.

THE COURT: I can take care of the first part of it very quickly.

MR. FLOOD: Like that.

THE COURT: Provide your notice.

MR. FLOOD: Exactly. Most of this is inferred in this district as taking place, but we just need to know exactly what that testimony will be. And we can logically infer what it will be, but we need to know exactly what it is.

It gets a little more complicated from here because we have been working diligently with our experts who, by the way,

1 understand the urgency of this matter, and we have done what we 2 can to communicate to them the Court's expectations about 3 moving this along. But as of right now we do not have 4 formalized reports from our experts. Mind you, we have had 5 possession of five full disks of validation studies, very 6 voluminous, very complicated, some of it practically 7 inscrutable materials for about as long as it took for the OCME 8 to produce it. They have been working through them. And we don't have a complete picture standing here right now of a 9 10 final understanding of how the OCME's work affected

However, we do have a preliminary call from more than one expert and this is where it gets complicated. And this comes back to the 702 problem. We have been unable to check the math, if you will.

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Mr. Johnson's DNA report.

THE COURT: Let me interrupt you for a second,

Mr. Flood. I know that you've written me on this before. But

the issue is that it's not so much that you are contesting that

alleles that match your client were on the gun. It is what are

the odds that sort of a very small DNA sample can be reliably

associated with a particular person.

MR. FLOOD: That is embedded in part of our challenge. But what FST, which is the program that's at issue here, does is not even quite that. It's a new paradigm.

Frankly, part of the problem here is, it's inherently

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confusing. A likelihood ratio is applied to the underlying DNA profile. Likelihood ratio is inherently different statistically than what we have been used to for well onto three decades now with DNA in the courtroom. We are used to saying, what's the likelihood that this DNA, that someone is excluded or included as a source of this sample. That's not what the likelihood ratio does. And what we have here let's just talk about, there is a strap, a sample from a strap. The sample from the strap, there is a number associated with it. It's 66 million. What's the chance that you are going to go pick somebody in a population and it's a 66 million chance that it's Kevin Johnson. That's not what the 66 million is.

The likelihood ratio in this case compares two probabilities or two propositions, excuse me. One proposition is that — on the top of this ratio. The top of the ratio is called the prosecutors' hypothesis, and that hypothesis is that this DNA profile on the gun includes Kevin Johnson, despite the fact that that profile on the gun only includes, by my calculations, about 72 percent of his DNA alleles, that is, it's missing about 28 percent of his alleles. And on the bottom it's typically referred to as the so-called defendant's hypothesis. We have rejected that title because, by the way, they never asked us what our hypothesis is.

THE COURT: I don't think the title is all that important.

MR. FLOOD: If we ever get to trial, we would moving in limine not to use that word.

THE COURT: That might be granted. But we are a long way from that, apparently.

MR. FLOOD: Thank you. That would be some unknown source.

THE COURT: That happens to share 72 percent of Kevin Johnson's alleles.

MR. FLOOD: Perhaps.

THE COURT: All of which is a function of how common are those alleles in the general population.

MR. FLOOD: Among other things. And in this case they also included two unknown sources in both above and below. And along with that we have the whole drop in and drop out and a number of other things that we are still trying to understand what goes into FST. They compare those two hypotheses. In that comparison — by the way, neither of these hypotheses may be true.

THE COURT: Depends on how you define the second one. It either is or it isn't his.

MR. FLOOD: The point is, both of them are conjectural. It is not that one or the other has a claim to accuracy. It is that both of them are hypotheses. When they run the calculation, based on the internal workings of this program, which is a black box program, not open source, which

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is for the field a strong recommendation that this software

should be open source because there are so many variables that

moving one decimal point one way or another could change by

orders of magnitude the product at the end. In Kevin Johnson's

case it's 66 million favoring the prosecutors' hypothesis.

The answer at the end is -- pardon me. I have got to get this one exactly right. The evidence is true, or the evidence is 66 million times more true if the prosecutors' hypothesis than if the defendant's hypothesis. It's a very arcane way of trying to explain this DNA sample.

THE COURT: It's not explaining the sample. It's explaining the likelihood that the sample came from your client, right?

> MR. FLOOD: Not exactly.

THE COURT: This isn't a low copy issue, right? You are not saying it wasn't a good sample. The question is whether given the fact that you don't have a full profile, is it more likely that it's associated with Mr. Johnson than it is with someone other than Mr. Johnson?

MR. FLOOD: That is one of the fair questions that could be asked of any sample and that is certainly why the government would want to introduce it. But the question is whether the statistic fairly explains this to the jury. And under 702, offering the likelihood of ratio actually explains that question in a way that's clear because that's not exactly

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typically operate against deadlines.

MR. FLOOD: That's true. But we have wrangled ours as best as we can. The problem with it is this and it is a confrontation issue, ultimately.

THE COURT: You don't have to persuade me that this is

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I want to set a schedule. You are telling me how to build a clock and that's lovely. I just want to set a schedule.

MR. FLOOD: The reason I'm laying this groundwork is because what I need to ask the Court --

THE COURT: You think I am not going to like it.

MR. FLOOD: I know you are not going to like it. we need is to get to the source code of FST because that's where the math lies. That's why open source is the --

THE COURT: You need the source code. They are not giving you the source code.

MR. FLOOD: Frankly, Mr. Swergold has been forthcoming, but this is the OCME, they are not going to like this either. It's proprietary. They have a copyright for it.

THE COURT: It doesn't mean it does not have to be It could be produced under a protective order.

MR. FLOOD: And we wouldn't object to that.

THE COURT: What's the story?

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MR. SWERGOLD: Your Honor, up until I walked into the courtroom today, defense has never requested the source code. When I spoke to OCME after receiving the lengthy discovery requests from the defense, one thing that was not in there was the source code, and I had spoken with OCME about it at that point, and they indicated that they do not want to turn over the source code.

If the defendant is asking for it, I would at least like an opportunity to go back with the OCME, find out what their position is, and if we need to put in a letter on that position. And I don't want to delay things any further. I would like a schedule, too. We can do that very quickly. We can do it while the rest of the schedule is set with respect to when the defendant is going to file his motion.

THE COURT: I don't think I can do that. This is sort of a whole other set of data. What do I know about evaluating source code. It seems to me, the first thing we need to find out is whether we are going to have to litigate whether they will turn it over or they won't; and if they won't turn it over, what's the import of that.

Why don't we do this. Check with the OCME. If they want a court order, I'm happy to sign an order. If they want it under a protective order, limited to the defense's experts,

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that's perfectly reasonable. Do you know who his expert is?

2 MR. SWERGOLD: I don't.

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THE COURT: You need to tell him. You don't need to tell me. I don't care. You need to tell him so he can tell OCME, tell the medical examiners just in case they have some particular issue with your expert that might figure into whether they are agreeable to this or not. Let me know by next week, next Wednesday, which would be the 3rd or the 4th.

MR. FLOOD: I believe it is the 3rd.

THE COURT: By the 4th whether they will disclose it or not; and if they will disclose it, when.

Is there anything else, Mr. Flood, other than the source code that you feel like you are lacking in order to do your job?

MR. FLOOD: No. That is the main issue.

THE COURT: If they say no, then I am going to schedule another status conference fairly quickly to talk about where we are going from there. If they say yes, then you also need to tell me in the letter how long it's going to take to do that, prepare an appropriate protective order, get it to me and I'll sign it.

I don't think I can do anything else other than exclude time between now and then in the interest of justice so that you can get all the information that you need in order to adequately defend your client. I find that that interest

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